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reviews

Images of Truth:
From Sign to Symbol
By Carlo Sini.
Translated by Massimo Verdicchio.
Edited by Hugh J. Silverman
and Graeme Nicholson .
Contemporary Studies in Philosophy,
and the Human Sciences, Atlantic
Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1993.

With this translation
of Carlo
Sini's Immagini di verita (1985)-ably
rendered by Massimp Verdicchio
(University of Alberta), and provided
with an introduction, footnotes, bibliography and index-not only for the
first time does a text by this important Italian philosopher
become
available to English-speaking readers, but also, an original attempt to
think through and beyond the fate of
metaphysics and its distinctive questioning of truth is brought before a
wider public. "Born out of the living
experience of courses taught at the
University of Milan" and deliberately
retaining the "presentational style of
the original lectures," Immagini diverita narrates an inevitable "stage" in
Sini's ongoing philosophical "journey" involved with "questioning
interpretation and the sign" (xxvii),
inevitable since the meaning of interpretation
and the sign belongs
together with that of truth.
Ostensibly, then, philosophers
ought to have common cause with
the intent of this text, as "the philosopher is first of all the friend of truth"
(xxviii). The thesis of this text, if one
may speak in such terms, is that
"truth may lie in the thorough thinking of nihilism .. . of what in
nihilism, as Heidegger would say,
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'makes us think' " (xxviii). The hesitation in talking about the thesis in
this way derives from the thesis itself.
"When interpretation takes on the
form, as in this case, of 'infinite semiosis' " (xxviii), such that "what
occurs in the interpretation is not the
absolute truth" (137), then any singular statement of a thesis cannot be circulated free and clear. Yet it is precisely in the recognition
of this
interpretive liability-"that where the
question of truth is concerned we are
all debtors" (xxviii)-that the crucial
truth of Sini' s own interpretation lies.
To the metaphysical ideal of "wellrounded truth" inscribed in the perfect identity of thinking and being,
Sini / juxtaposes the thesis that "the
world 'contains infinite interpretations' [Nietzsche]." Yet merely to
affirm this thesis against metaphysics
is to remain in nihilism and thus to
"say 'no' to what metaphysics has for
centuries said or tried to say 'yes' to,
but ... on the same premises" (80).
Hence it is to affirm a "no" that "is
equivalent to the metaphysical 'yes' it
wants to destroy" (110). To assert
with absolute authority that in the
matter of truth there is no absolute
authority is not then so much selfcontradictory as nonsensical. "On the
strength of its logic, conceived as the
only possible one," nihilism is an
answer to the metaphysical question
"What is truth?" that robs the question itself of its very sense. Moreover,
"nihilism contradicts common experience and the very structure of experience" (80) by leaving in the dark the
enigma that there is for us an 'object'.
Sini' s task is to provide "an assessment of the images of truth that have
. . . characterized and founded our
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overall history ... to show the reasons behind this history and to
explain eventually what new image
of truth supports it" (xxviii-xxix). The
first part of the book examines truth's
images in the thinking of selected
"great
authors"
( especially
Parmenides, Aristotle, Hegel, and
Heidegger) in order to show by these
examples that the founding presupposition that constitutes the sense of
metaphysics-the
absolute identity of
thinking and being-contains
in all
its "images" its own "catastrophe"
(lit. kata-strophe "over-turning"). In
our own age, this holds both of the
nihilistic pursuit of unlimited knowledge and power and the 'thinking of
being' that is meant to point beyond
this fate and to leave metaphysics to
itself. Yet such thinking "continues to
wander around and within the 'public places' (truth, error, being, nothing) instituted by the public logos of
metaphysics", without "eyes for the
non-metaphysical [and the non-public] 'sense' of experience" (144-45).
Sini' s own quest for a "new image" is
thus not meant to shore up the fated
metaphysical project in a new way,
but to renew non-metaphysically the
philosophical
commitment to the
sense of experience and to knowing
what we are doing and why. In place
of the "metaphysical will to dominate
experience totally and to 'resolve it'
completely in 'public' truths that are
functionally effective and symbolically senseless" (153), Sini ventures to
discover the original constitutive
"finiteness of experience", precisely
not as its imperfection
but as its
"enchantment", that is, its original
symbolic character as "finite and perfect part" that "lacks nothing" (123-

24). In this discovery may now lie the
origin, justification and destiny of
philosophy.
ROBERT BURCH
University of Alberta

Critics dell' oggettivazione e ragione stories: Saggio su
P. Yorck von Wartenburg
By Francesco Donadio.
Napoli: Edizione Guida, 1992.

For most philosophers, with the
exception
of the
reader
of
Heidegger's Being and Time, the figure of Count Paul Yorck von
Wartenburg (1835-1897) remains little
known. In section 77 of Being and
Time, Heidegger uses some of Yorck's
more profound speculative theses
concerning the concept of historicity.
Heidegger constructs, as we know,
his reading of Yorck, utilizing some
significant
texts
from
the
Briefwechseln between Yorck and
Wilhelm Dilthey, and Heidegger
demonstrates as the programmatic
task of a research on historicity, that
the study of Dilthey's own work
must be undertaken "in the spirit" of
Count Yorck.
One could single out in this second half of the 1920s the corning out
of anonymity of Yorck and together
with this the official and authoritative recognition of his philosophical
depth. In fact, within the panorama
of traditional academic philosophy,
Count Yorck presents himself as an
outsider: jurisconsult and member of
the Prussian senate, administrator of

